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OPINION OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 The City of Philadelphia has a written policy 
preventing private advertisers from displaying non-
commercial content at the Philadelphia International Airport. 
The City, which owns the Airport, says the policy helps it 
further its goals of maximizing revenue and avoiding 
controversy. The record, however, reveals substantial flaws in 
those justifications. The City acknowledges the flaws but 
nonetheless maintains that the ban on non-commercial ads is 
a reasonable use of governmental power. It is not. Because 
the ban is unreasonable, it violates the First Amendment and 
cannot be enforced as written. The District Court reached the 
same conclusion, and we therefore affirm.  
I. Background 
A. The City’s policy  
 The City has long accepted paid advertisements that 
are posted in display cases and on screens throughout the 
Airport. In January 2011, the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People submitted an ad for display 
at the Airport. It offered to pay the prevailing market rate for 
the ad, which read: “Welcome to America, home to 5% of the 
world’s people & 25% of the world’s prisoners. Let’s build a 
better America together. NAACP.org/smartandsafe.” At the 
time the City did not have a written policy governing the 
types of ads it would display at the Airport. It nonetheless 
rejected the submission based on an informal practice of only 
accepting ads that proposed a commercial transaction.  
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 The NAACP filed a lawsuit in October 2011 claiming 
that the City’s rejection of its ad violated the First 
Amendment and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In 
March 2012, while the lawsuit was pending, the City adopted 
the written policy now before us. It states that ads that do not 
“propose a commercial transaction” cannot be approved. 
“[C]ommercial transaction” is not defined. Other categories 
of ads that cannot be displayed are those: 1) “relating to the 
sale or use of alcohol or tobacco products”; 2) containing 
“sexually explicit representations and/or relat[ing] to sexually 
oriented businesses or products”; and 3) “relating to political 
campaigns.” There is an exception that allows the City to post 
non-commercial ads promoting subjects that include 
Philadelphia tourism, City initiatives, air service, and use of 
the Airport. The policy only covers the Airport’s advertising 
space. In other areas of the Airport, travelers see a wide range 
of non-commercial content. For instance, there are televisions 
and newsstands throughout, often in close proximity to ads 
governed by the policy.  
 The City argues that the ban on non-commercial 
content1 maximizes revenue and avoids controversy. 
Specifically, it maintains that displaying non-commercial ads, 
which might relate to religious or social issues, could 
jeopardize revenue from companies that do not want their 
content posted near potentially divisive messages. Similarly, 
the City contends that accepting non-commercial ads might 
expose travelers to content they find offensive. 
                                              
1 Because the exception allowing City-sponsored non-
commercial content does not bear on our analysis, we 
hereafter describe the policy as imposing a ban without 
reference to the exception.  
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 In connection with the adoption of the written policy, 
the City agreed to display the NAACP’s ad for three months 
and to pay the organization $8,800 in attorney’s fees. The 
parties also agreed that the NAACP would file an amended 
complaint to challenge the newly adopted policy. It did so in 
August 2012. The amended complaint presents a facial 
challenge to the ban on non-commercial content. There is no 
challenge to any other portion of the policy.  
B. Deposition testimony 
 As part of discovery in the lawsuit, the NAACP 
deposed James Tyrrell, the Airport’s Deputy Director of 
Aviation and Property Management/Business Development. 
The City designated Tyrrell, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 30(b)(6), to testify on its behalf on numerous 
topics, including the “reason or purpose and the factors 
considered by the City for its decision to adopt, create, enact 
or promulgate the [written policy], and any communications 
concerning that decision.” Despite this designation, Tyrrell 
could not offer any conclusive explanation for why the City 
adopted the ban on non-commercial content. Indeed, asked 
whether he had “an understanding” of the reason for 
distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial ads, 
he responded that he did not. 
 Because the City defends the ban on the grounds of 
revenue maximization and controversy avoidance, Tyrrell’s 
testimony on these points merits a detailed discussion. With 
respect to revenue, he said that the purpose of allowing 
advertising in the Airport is to make money. He had two 
opportunities during his deposition to discuss any connection 
that might exist between the ban and this goal. First, when 
asked specifically about the NAACP’s ad, Tyrrell testified 
that it was not “consistent with the message that the [A]irport 
wants to deliver in terms of promoting tourism, promoting the 
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region and making it a very hospitable place. Advertisers look 
at that as well.” However, asked whether he had any reason 
“beyond the realm of conjecture and speculation” to think that 
displaying the ad might cost the Airport revenue, Tyrrell 
conceded that he did not.  
 On the second occasion, Tyrrell disowned the notion 
that the policy was motivated by revenue concerns. The 
following exchange is particularly instructive:  
Q [by Fred Magaziner, attorney for NAACP]: 
In determining that it was prudent and the time 
had come to adopt [the written] policy, was one 
of your purposes to prevent loss of revenue 
from commercial advertisers? 
[Objection] 
A [by Tyrrell]: No. 
. . .   
Q: And that distinction that the policy draws 
between [commercial and non-commercial ads], 
that has nothing to do with revenue; correct? 
A: I do not believe so, no. 
Q: You do not believe it has anything to do with 
revenue? 
A: No. 
As part of that same exchange, he also suggested that the 
policy might even cost the City money because it forces the 
Airport to turn away willing advertisers. Asked whether he 
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would be “happy” from a business perspective selling non-
commercial ads, he said that he would be.  
 Meanwhile, Tyrrell also offered testimony relevant to 
the theme of avoiding controversy. Though that term can 
mean many things, his testimony sharply limited the 
possibilities. For instance, one possible meaning might be that 
the City is concerned about the risk of attribution if it 
permitted non-commercial ads to be displayed. In particular, 
it might be worried that passersby would assume that the 
City, which owns the advertising space, endorses the views of 
non-commercial advertisers. But Tyrrell testified that he had 
no reason to believe that the ban had anything to do with 
maintaining a neutral position for the City on issues of non-
commercial speech. Another possibility might be that the ban, 
under which all non-commercial ads are rejected, prevents the 
City from playing favorites by accepting messages it likes 
while turning away ones it does not. Yet, asked if avoiding 
the appearance of favoritism or minimizing the chances for 
abuse motivated the ban, Tyrrell said that he did not have any 
reason to think so. He gave the same answer when asked 
whether the ban related to a desire not to impose on captive 
audiences (i.e., people who are in the Airport by necessity and 
cannot avoid the messages merely by going somewhere else).  
 The only possibility not eliminated was that non-
commercial ads might be more likely than commercial ones 
to offend travelers. This is the theory the City advances on 
appeal. Tyrrell testified that this “may” have something to do 
with the adoption of the ban. However, he said that he did not 
recall if this idea had “ever been discussed in any meeting or 
conversation” that he had. And he admitted it was something 
he just thought of as he sat for his deposition.  
 Finally, Tyrrell, on a general level, described the 
Airport as a “very stressful” place in light of the commotion 
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and anxiety that frequently accompany travel. As a result, 
management makes “a very concentrated and huge effort to 
keep everything positive, everything non-controversial, and 
just create an environment that is soothing and pleasing.”  
C. The City’s position  
 The City initially argued (at least in its briefing) that 
its subjective intentions in adopting the ban were to maximize 
revenue and avoid controversy. See Appellant’s Br. at 17–18. 
By the time of oral argument, however, it relied almost 
exclusively on the contention that its “actual thoughts and 
thinking” on the subject “don’t matter.” Oral Arg. Tr. at 7. 
The City also maintained that Tyrrell’s testimony about the 
ban was irrelevant. Id. at 18 (“I don’t think it matters what the 
witness says.”). Moreover, it agreed that the reasons it was 
offering—revenue maximization and controversy 
avoidance—might be after-the-fact justifications that are 
“strictly in the realm of lawyer argumentation.” Id. at 55; see 
also id. at 16–17 (asked if the City can invent justifications 
when writing its appellate briefs, counsel for the City 
answered yes). The City further conceded the possibility that 
its actual intent might have been to suppress viewpoints that 
cast Philadelphia or the region in a negative light. Id. at 16 
(noting that its intent “might have been viewpoint 
discriminatory”).  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the NAACP’s 
First Amendment claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 
It issued two opinions. In the first it granted summary 
judgment to the NAACP. NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, 39 
F. Supp. 3d 611, 635 (E.D. Pa. 2014). And in the second it 
granted the NAACP declaratory relief and an injunction 
preventing the City from enforcing the ban as written. 
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NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. No. 11-6533, 2014 WL 
7272410, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2014). Per 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, we have jurisdiction over the timely appeal of the 
latter ruling.  
 Our review is plenary. See Aleynikov v. Goldman 
Sachs Group, Inc., 765 F.3d 350, 357 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“Ordinarily we review a district court’s grant of an 
injunction for abuse of discretion. But where . . . the 
injunction results [from] a summary judgment motion, our 
review is plenary.”) (internal citation omitted); Borden v. Sch. 
Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 174 n.17 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (plenary review over questions of law in 
connection with declaratory judgment actions).  
 Granting summary judgment “is appropriate if . . . 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” State Auto 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 
(3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Additionally, 
[a]lthough the non-moving party receives the 
benefit of all factual inferences in the court’s 
consideration of a motion for summary 
judgment, the non[-]moving party must point to 
some evidence in the record that creates a 
genuine issue of material fact. In this respect, 
summary judgment is essentially ‘put up or shut 
up’ time for the non-moving party: [it] must 
rebut the motion with facts in the record and 
cannot rest solely on assertions made in the 
pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.  
Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d 




 Our analysis proceeds in five parts. We begin with a 
discussion of the nature of the public property at issue. After 
laying that groundwork, we analyze who must bear the 
burden of proof. We then address the standards for meeting 
that burden. Next we apply the framework to our facts. 
Finally, we consider and reject a counterargument to our 
holding.  
A. Forum analysis 
 Because this case involves a restriction on the types of 
speech allowed on public property, we begin with forum 
analysis. Though often complicated in practice, this analysis 
stems from a simple premise—not every public property is 
the same, and different types of property will require different 
treatment. As a result, the Supreme Court has grouped public 
properties along a spectrum.  
 On one end of the spectrum, we have traditional public 
forums. These properties, which include public streets and 
parks, “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of 
the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.” Perry Educ. Ass’n 
v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Content-based speech 
restrictions in traditional public forums get strict scrutiny, 
which means that the government must show a compelling 
state interest and narrow tailoring of measures to achieve that 
interest (including the absence of less restrictive alternatives). 
Id.  
 In the middle, we have designated public forums. 
These are properties that have “not traditionally been 
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regarded as a public forum [but are] intentionally opened up 
for that purpose.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 
460, 469 (2009). As with traditional public forums, content-
based restrictions get strict scrutiny. Id. at 469–70.  
 The final category is sometimes called a limited public 
forum and other times labeled a nonpublic forum. It is 
reserved for government properties that have not, as a matter 
of tradition or designation, been used for purposes of 
assembly and communication. These enjoy the least 
protection under the First Amendment. Content-based 
restrictions are valid as long as they are reasonable and 
viewpoint neutral. See id. at 470; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).2 Unlike 
with strict scrutiny, this review does not require narrow 
tailoring or the absence of less restrictive alternatives. Indeed, 
the “Government’s decision to restrict access . . . need only 
be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only 
reasonable limitation.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808 (emphasis 
in original). Moreover, the government’s asserted interest in 
drawing content-based distinctions must be valid, but it does 
not have to be compelling. K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono 
Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 106 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 Here the relevant forum is the Airport’s advertising 
space (rather than the Airport in its entirety) because that is 
the specific public property that the NAACP seeks to access. 
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (noting that in “defining the 
                                              
2 There has been some confusion about whether there are any 
practical differences between nonpublic and limited public 
forums. However, the Supreme Court recently “has used the 
term[s] . . . interchangeably . . .[,] thus suggesting that these 
categories of forums are the same.” Galena v. Leone, 638 
F.3d 186, 197 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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forum we have focused on the access sought by the speaker”); 
see also Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pennsylvania 
Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) (in case 
involving challenge to rejection of advertisements, defining 
forum as public transit system’s advertising space rather than 
entirety of transit system). The District Court concluded that 
the advertising space is a limited public/nonpublic forum. 
NAACP, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 627.  
 We assume, without deciding, that the Court was 
correct.3 That is because our conclusion that the ban on non-
commercial content is unreasonable means that it is 
unconstitutional no matter what we label the forum. In other 
words, reasonableness is a bare minimum in forum cases. 
Some types of forums require more than reasonableness, but 
none allow less. Cf. Pittsburgh League of Young Voters Educ. 
Fund v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 653 F.3d 290, 296 
                                              
3 The Airport more broadly (as distinct from the advertising 
space) is also likely a limited public/nonpublic forum. 
Although airports are places where the public assembles, they 
are not traditional public forums. See Int’l Soc. for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) 
(“ISKCON”) (“[G]iven the lateness with which the modern 
air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for 
the description of having immemorially [and] time out of 
mind been held in the public trust and used for purposes of 
expressive activity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). And 
although it is conceivable that an airport could, under the 
right circumstances, become a designated public forum, the 
Supreme Court has said that this is unlikely. See id. at 682–83 
(concluding that the John F. Kennedy, La Guardia, and 
Newark airports in New York and New Jersey, which are “far 
from atypical,” are not designated public forums). 
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(3d Cir. 2011) (“Pittsburgh”) (noting that we “need not tackle 
the forum-selection question” when a law or regulation would 
be invalid in any type of forum). 
B. Allocating the burden 
 The core question for us is whether the City’s ban on 
non-commercial content is reasonable. At the heart of this is 
the tension between its justifications on the one hand and the 
record that we have before us on the other. Typically, when 
the government exercises its police powers, the scrutiny we 
apply is rational-basis review. Under this standard, a 
“legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding 
and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by 
evidence or empirical data.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 
508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). One of the hallmarks of rational-
basis review is that the challenger, not the government, bears 
the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a law or 
regulation. See id. at 314–15 (“On rational-basis review, [a 
statute] comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, 
and those attacking the rationality of [a] legislative 
classification have the burden to negat[e] every conceivable 
basis which might support it.”) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  
 Though the City does not invoke rational-basis review 
by name, these are the standards it uses to support its 
reasonableness arguments. This no doubt has some surface 
appeal, as “reasonable” and “rational” are frequently used as 
synonyms. But rational-basis review is not just the sum total 
of the various dictionary definitions of the word “rational.” 
Rather, it is a legal test that over time has developed certain 
characteristics—for instance, an allocation of the burden to 
the challenger and a strong presumption of validity. These 
requirements were developed to serve the circumstances in 
which courts apply rational-basis review—run-of-the-mill 
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exercises of police powers. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental 
right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold [a] legislative 
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some 
legitimate end.”). 
 By contrast, when a law or regulation burdens a 
fundamental right such as the First Amendment, rational basis 
yields to more exacting review. Indeed, it has been the 
Supreme Court’s “consistent position that democracy stands 
on a stronger footing when courts protect First Amendment 
interests against legislative intrusion, rather than deferring to 
merely rational legislative judgments in this area.” 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 519 
(1981) (plurality opinion). Thus, unlike with rational-basis 
review, when “the Government restricts speech, [it] bears the 
burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.” United 
States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 
816 (2000). This is so because the “presumption of validity 
that traditionally attends [the exercise of police powers] 
carries little, if any, weight where the . . . regulation trenches 
on rights of expression protected under the First 
Amendment.” Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 
61, 77 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
 Neither the Supreme Court nor our Court has expressly 
decided the allocation of the burden to establish 
reasonableness in a limited public or nonpublic forum.4 This 
                                              
4 We note that dicta from our Court goes in both directions. 
Compare United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 275 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (suggesting that the government bears the burden), 
with Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1371 
(3d Cir. 1990) (likening the review to a rational-basis test). 
Both statements were dicta because we ultimately determined 
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is not surprising. Reasonableness is a relatively low bar, and 
in most instances the technical question of who bears the 
burden will not be consequential because the law or 
regulation would survive either way. But this is not a normal 
case, as the record here is strangely void of support for the 
City’s ban.  
 With the question now before us for the first time, we 
see no reason why the Playboy Entertainment Group rule 
would not apply. Even in limited public and nonpublic 
forums, First Amendment protections still exist. See, e.g., 
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 
U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981) (“The First Amendment[’s] . . . 
ramifications are not confined to the public forum . . . .”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Pittsburgh, 653 F.3d at 
299 (assuming that the forum was nonpublic and striking 
down on First Amendment grounds the rejection of an 
advertisement). This is sufficient to shift the burden from the 
challenger to the City. It is true that the burden the City 
shoulders is “much more limited” than, for instance, strict (or 
even intermediate) scrutiny. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 679. But 
the burden, however limited, is still the City’s to meet.  
 This jibes with how some of our sister courts have 
defined reasonableness. See, e.g., Sammartano v. First 
Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“The ‘reasonableness’ requirement for restrictions on speech 
in a nonpublic forum requires more of a showing than does 
the traditional rational basis test; i.e., it is not the same as 
establish[ing] that the regulation is rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental objective, as might be the case for 
the typical exercise of the government’s police power.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alternation in original), 
                                                                                                     




abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Multimedia Pub. Co. of S.C. 
v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154, 159 
(4th Cir. 1993) (“[I]t isn’t enough simply to establish that the 
regulation is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
objective, as might be the case for a typical exercise of the 
government’s police power, for this regulation affects 
protected First Amendment activity that is entitled to special 
solicitude even in this nonpublic forum.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
C. How to meet the burden 
 The next logical question is how the City can satisfy 
its burden to show that the ban on non-commercial content is 
reasonable. Our review of a trio of Supreme Court opinions, 
all written by Justice O’Connor, demonstrates that there are 
two ways it can do so: record evidence or commonsense 
inferences.  
   In the first case, Cornelius, which involved restrictions 
on participation in a charitable campaign in the federal 
workplace, the Court framed the reasonableness test for 
limited public and nonpublic forums as follows: “The 
reasonableness of the Government’s restriction of access . . .  
must be assessed in the light of the purpose of the forum and 
all the surrounding circumstances.” 473 U.S. at 809. In 
applying this framework, the Court focused on the record 
evidence before it. See, e.g., id. at 808 (“Based on the present 
record, we disagree and conclude that respondents may be 
excluded from the [forum].”) (emphasis added); id. at 811 
(“On this record, the Government’s posited justifications for 
denying respondents access to the [forum] appear to be 




 The next case, United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 
(1990), showed that not every conclusion needs to be backed 
up by evidence. Justice O’Connor, writing for a plurality, 
clarified that courts can use “common-sense” to “uphold a 
regulation under reasonableness review.” Id. at 734–35 
(plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Kokinda came about because the Postal Service, after years of 
trying to allow some types of solicitation of money on its 
property while precluding others, found that this approach 
was unworkable and that the better course was to prohibit all 
solicitation. The resulting regulation was supported by a 
thorough record, but for one point—the notion that 
solicitation is more disruptive than handing out literature—
the plurality said that judges need look no further than logic 
and experience. Id.    
 The final piece of the puzzle is Justice O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion in ISKCON. There was a majority opinion 
written in that case by Chief Justice Rehnquist upholding a 
solicitation ban at three airports run by the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey. Meanwhile, a majority of the 
Court agreed that restrictions on distributing leaflets at those 
same airports were invalid, but the justices could not agree on 
a rationale. In these situations, “the holding of the Court may 
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.” City of 
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 n.9 
(1988) (internal quotation marks and alternation omitted). 
Justice O’Connor’s views on leafleting were the narrowest 
and therefore speak for the Court. See, e.g., New England 
Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 20 n.5 (1st 
Cir. 2002) (“Because Justice O’Connor’s ISKCON 
concurrence constitutes the narrowest ground for the decision, 
it is the most authoritative pronouncement on the standards 
applicable to [leafleting] in a non-public forum.”); Hawkins v. 
18 
 
City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 
1999) (same).  
 The portion of her opinion dealing with leafleting 
makes clear that, whether the support comes from record 
evidence or common sense, courts must have some way of 
evaluating restrictions. The opinion contrasted the facts of 
that case, where there was no “record evidence to support [the 
leafleting] ban,” with those of Cornelius, where “the record 
amply support[ed]” the restriction on speech, and those of 
Kokinda, where the solicitation ban was based on “the Postal 
Service’s 30-year history of regulation.” ISKCON, 505 U.S. 
at 691–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring and concurring in 
judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second 
alternation in original).  
 As Justice O’Connor explained, although the 
government does not need to prove that a particular use will 
actually disrupt the “intended function” of its property, id. at 
691 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 52 n.12) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), “we have required some explanation as to 
why certain speech is inconsistent with the intended use of 
the forum,” id. at 691–92. The opinion goes on to hold that 
the leafleting ban was unreasonable because “the Port 
Authority has provided no . . . reason for prohibiting 
leafleting, and the record contains no information from which 
we can draw an inference that would support its ban.” Id. at 
692.  
 To synthesize, then, the City has a two-step burden 
that it can satisfy using record evidence or commonsense 
inferences. First, given that reasonableness “must be assessed 
in the light of the purpose of the forum and all the 
surrounding circumstances,” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809, the 
evidence or commonsense inferences must allow us to grasp 
the purpose to which the City has devoted the forum. See also 
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Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (“The State, no less 
than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the 
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 
dedicated.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). And second, 
the evidence or commonsense inferences also must provide a 
way of tying the limitation on speech to the forum’s purpose. 
The City need not prove that the banned speech would cause 
harm if permitted, but per ISKCON it must provide a 
legitimate explanation for the restriction. In this context, we 
proceed to analyze the City’s ban on non-commercial content.  
D. Applying the standards 
 The City has argued that its objectives for the 
advertising space are revenue maximization and controversy 
avoidance and that the ban furthers them. Both justifications 
suffer from a lack of record evidence. And even with the 
benefit of commonsense inferences, neither passes muster.   
  As for revenue, Tyrrell testified that the City allows 
advertising in order to make money, and there is nothing to 
suggest otherwise. As such, the City has met the first part of 
its burden, which is to establish that revenue maximization is 
a purpose of the forum. But where things start to break down 
for the City is that there is no record evidence showing that 
the ban is reasonably connected to this goal. Although Tyrrell 
testified that advertisers “look at” the types of ads posted in 
the Airport to determine whether they would want to 
advertise in proximity to those messages, he made clear that 
the ban was not intended to promote revenue and that in 
practice it arguably costs the City money. 
 Whereas the revenue justification runs into trouble at 
step two (showing a connection between the restriction and 
the purpose), the controversy avoidance rationale hits a snag 
even earlier in the analysis. In light of Tyrrell’s testimony, the 
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only controversy the City could be trying to avoid is 
travelers’ exposure to non-commercial content they might 
find offensive. But no record evidence shows this is a purpose 
to which the City has devoted the Airport’s advertising space. 
The City had ample opportunities in Tyrrell’s deposition, as 
well as that of Mark Gale, the Airport’s CEO, to provide 
support for this purported purpose. And even after the 
depositions, the City could have come forward with 
affidavits. But the record we have lacks any evidence that 
directly supports its argument on appeal. This harms the 
City’s position because, although reasonableness review gives 
it the discretion to preserve a forum “for the use to which it is 
lawfully dedicated,” Greer, 424 U.S. at 836 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), this presupposes that it actually has 
dedicated the property to that particular use, and we have no 
evidence that this occurred here.  
 The City’s failure to produce record evidence to clear 
step two on revenue maximization and step one on 
controversy avoidance could be excused if commonsense 
inferences supported its theory of the case. But they do not. In 
light of the testimony and the surrounding circumstances, an 
appeal to common sense cannot salvage the ban.  
 Given Tyrrell’s testimony that the ban is unrelated to 
revenue and arguably costs the City money, logic does not 
allow an inference that it is reasonably connected to revenue 
maximization. Indeed, what makes this case so unusual is that 
the record belies the inference the City wants us to draw. The 
City says we can ignore this and pretend Tyrrell’s deposition 
never occurred. This Alice-in-Wonderland argument misses 
the mark. The ability to use common sense is not a license to 
close our eyes and suspend disbelief. In other words, we 
cannot conclude that the ban serves a purpose that the City’s 
own representative has already disclaimed.  
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 As for avoidance of controversy, inferences cannot 
help the City get past the first step of the inquiry—
demonstrating that it has dedicated the advertising space to 
keeping travelers from seeing potentially offensive non-
commercial content. We note at the outset that, although the 
City is permitted under the right circumstances to dedicate a 
limited public or nonpublic forum to controversy avoidance, 
this objective is nebulous and not susceptible to objective 
verification. As a result, Supreme Court guidance cautions 
against readily drawing inferences, in the absence of 
evidence, that controversy avoidance renders the ban 
constitutional. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 812 (“[T]he 
purported concern to avoid controversy excited by particular 
groups may conceal a bias against the viewpoint advanced by 
the excluded speakers.”); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510 
(plurality opinion) (noting that judgments that are 
“necessarily subjective, defying objective evaluation . . . must 
be carefully scrutinized to determine if they are only a public 
rationalization of an impermissible purpose”). This is 
particularly apt here because the City has conceded that its 
justifications might be after-the-fact rationalizations. See Oral 
Arg. Tr. at 16–17.5 Against this backdrop, the inference that 
the City wants us to draw is without support.  
                                              
5 Q: But you’re telling us right now—the reasons for the 
written policies were enhanced revenue and avoid[ance] [of] 
controversy. And those are good reasons, but you’ve got to 
supplement them by something, some support in the record. 
A: No, you don’t, actually. That’s—that’s— 
Q: You don’t? 
A: You don’t. That is the key. The [C]ity is— 
Q: You can make it up now? 
A: Well, I—perhaps in the trial—                                                                                               
. . .  
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 The only possible basis for an inference would be 
general testimony about the Airport. For instance, the City 
highlights Tyrrell’s testimony that the Airport is a “very 
stressful” place, and hence there must be “a very concentrated 
and huge effort to keep everything positive, everything non-
controversial, and just create an environment that is soothing 
and pleasing.” This testimony does not relate specifically to 
the Airport’s advertising space, but rather speaks to that 
facility more broadly, of which the advertising space is but a 
small part. From this the City asks us to draw an inference 
that its asserted justification—preventing exposure to 
potentially offensive messages—is consistent with a purpose 
of the advertising space.  
 But if the City seeks to justify its regulation of the 
advertising space by reference to its goals for the entire 
Airport, then we should consider whether the atmosphere in 
the rest of the Airport supports such an inference. See, e.g., 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801–02 (looking to the “the special 
nature and function” of the broader property in which the 
forum is located). Elsewhere in the Airport, travelers have 
frequent exposure to televisions broadcasting shows and 
commercials containing a wide variety of non-commercial 
content. For instance, the NAACP submitted pictures of the 
Airport’s televisions that show content related to a 
gubernatorial election in Virginia, the war on drugs, the 
Confederate flag, and a piece of anti-discrimination 
legislation. And as they pass by newsstands, travelers can see 
magazines and newspapers displaying the very types of non-
                                                                                                     
Q: Or when you write your brief. 
A: Correct. 
Q: Because no matter what you write you can make it up . . . . 




commercial information that the City seeks to exclude from 
its advertising space.  
 All of this indicates that there is little logic to the 
inference the City asks us to draw. Although we have no 
reason to doubt that the City does try to maintain a “soothing 
and pleasing” environment in the Airport, that broader effort 
apparently does not involve shielding travelers from non-
commercial content on the ground that it might offend them. 
Instead, the Airport exposes them to an onslaught of non-
commercial content outside of its advertising space without 
any suggestion that doing so is inconsistent with the 
environment it seeks to foster. 
 The City’s argument is essentially that common sense 
supports the inference that it would devote its advertising 
space to a purpose to which the rest of the Airport does not 
subscribe. Given that the advertising space is physically part 
of the Airport, this argument fails. As the D.C. Circuit has 
noted in a similar context:  
Although we readily acknowledge the fact that 
the airports’ advertising facilities are physically 
distinct parts of the terminals . . .[,] we note that 
these facilities are for the most part physically 
‘separated’ from the terminals only by glass 
panels or translucent plexiglass whose sole 
purpose is to frame or project messages of 
outside organizations to the terminals’ . . . 
users. . . . Given this context, the display 
advertising areas at [the airports] cannot be 
wholly divorced—by structure, function, or 




U.S. Sw. Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United 
States, 708 F.2d 760, 764–66 (D.C. Cir. 1983), abrogated on 
other grounds by ISKCON. 
 In sum, the City has not presented record evidence 
sufficient to demonstrate that its ban is reasonable. Nor does 
the record permit us to draw that inference using common 
sense. As a result, the ban violates the First Amendment.  
E. The City’s counterargument 
 The City relies heavily on previous cases in which 
courts have examined commercial/non-commercial 
distinctions. This reliance is misplaced. Reasonableness is a 
case-specific inquiry, meaning that previous examples are of 
limited usefulness. And, under our facts, the City’s ban is 
unreasonable.  
 In distinguishing between commercial and non-
commercial content, the City was by no means writing on a 
blank slate. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, the Supreme 
Court upheld as reasonable such a distinction for 
advertisements on a city’s bus system. 418 U.S. 298, 304 
(1974) (plurality opinion) (“The city consciously has limited 
access to its transit system advertising space in order to 
minimize chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and 
the risk of imposing upon a captive audience. These are 
reasonable legislative objectives advanced by the city in a 
proprietary capacity.”); id. (“Revenue earned from long-term 
commercial advertising could be [jeopardized] by a 
requirement that short-term candidacy or issue-oriented 
advertisements be displayed on car cards.”). However, 
Lehman does not help the City. As discussed, the NAACP 
asked Tyrrell about each of the factors from that case—
minimizing abuse, avoiding favoritism, not imposing on a 
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captive audience, and maximizing revenue—and he 
disclaimed all of them.6  
 The City also cites decisions of our sister courts 
labeling as reasonable distinctions on transit systems between 
commercial and non-commercial advertisements. See, e.g., 
Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 979 
(9th Cir. 1998); Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. 
(Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650, 653 (2d Cir.), opinion amended on 
denial of reh’g, 89 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995). Additionally, in 
Pittsburgh we struck down a commercial/non-commercial 
distinction as viewpoint discriminatory but noted that under 
the right circumstances such a provision might be 
constitutional. 653 F.3d at 299. However, none of this 
relieves us of our obligation to determine reasonableness on a 
case-by-case basis in light of the facts and circumstances of 
each particular forum. Cf. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Dep’t 
of Aviation of City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144, 1159 (7th Cir. 
1995) (“This [reasonableness] inquiry requires an 
examination of both the governmental interest and the 
particular forum’s nature and function. The fact that Lehman 
                                              
6 Lehman was a plurality opinion. Justice Douglas provided 
the fifth vote for the outcome in a concurring opinion that 
focused heavily on the issue of captive audiences. See id. at 
308 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment) (“Since I do not 
believe that petitioner has any constitutional right to spread 
his message before this captive audience, I concur in the 
Court’s judgment.”). The parties dispute the extent to which 
Lehman, in light of Justice Douglas’s opinion, should be 
limited to situations that present a captive audience. However, 
given that none of the interests served by the ban in Lehman 




upheld a policy of excluding political advertisements in 
public buses hardly determines the reasonableness of such a 
restriction for all time. Instead, the reasonableness of [a 
restriction] must be judged in light of the nature and purpose 
of the [forum].”) (internal citations omitted). For the reasons 
previously discussed, the City’s ban fails this test.  
* * * * * 
 No matter the type of forum, restrictions on speech on 
government property must be reasonable. The City’s ban on 
non-commercial ads at the Airport is unreasonable because it 
is not supported by the record or by commonsense inferences. 
The burden to establish reasonableness is a light one, but the 
City has failed to meet it here.7 We need not determine 
                                              
7 Apart from reasonableness, a second requirement that exists 
no matter how we label the forum is viewpoint neutrality. 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. Because unreasonableness is 
sufficient by itself to render the policy unconstitutional, we 
do not reach the viewpoint question. We note nonetheless that 
the issue may be a closer call than our dissenting colleague 
suggests. As discussed, the City has conceded that the policy 
might have been motivated by an animosity toward certain 
viewpoints. The dissent, relying on the “familiar principle of 
constitutional law that [we] will not strike down an otherwise 
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit 
legislative motive,” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 
383 (1968), says that this does not matter. But in Cornelius 
the Court suggested that a restriction will be unconstitutional 
if it was “impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a 
particular point of view.” 473 U.S. at 812–13. Indeed, Justice 
Stevens’s dissent clarified that “[e]veryone on the Court 
agrees that [a restriction] is prohibited by the First 
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whether the ban could survive on a different record; contrary 
to our dissenting colleague’s suggestion, see Dissent at 6 n.3, 
we take no position on this question. Our inquiry is limited to 
what is before us, and on that record the ban does not survive. 
As a result, we affirm the District Court’s grant of declaratory 
and injunctive relief.8  
                                                                                                     
Amendment if it is motivated by a bias against the views of 
the excluded groups.” Id. at 833 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Though some courts appear to say that motive is not enough 
and that there must be evidence that the restriction is being 
implemented in a discriminatory way, see Dissent at 15, we 
have never so held. As such, we note that this remains an 
open question in our Court.  
 
8 The District Court’s grant of relief also covered an 
unwritten policy under which the City rejected advertisements 
that did not “support the mission” of the Airport. NAACP, 
2014 WL 7272410, at *3. In the District Court, the City 
denied that the unwritten policy existed. However, it has said 
on appeal that it does not seek reversal of the Court’s ruling 
on the unwritten policy if we affirm with respect to the 
written policy. See Appellant’s Br. at 24. Because the City 
has waived any challenge to the unwritten policy as distinct 
from the written one, we affirm the Court’s entry of judgment 
in its entirety without separately considering the unwritten 
policy.  
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
v. City of Philadelphia, No. 15-1002 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 “[T]he government, ‘no less than a private owner of 
property, has power to preserve the property under its control 
for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.’” Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 
(1985) (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)). In 
this appeal, the Court deprives the City of Philadelphia of this 
power by finding its ban on noncommercial advertising in 
parts of its airport facially invalid because the prohibition 
lacks record and common sense support. Because I view the 
City’s restriction a reasonable attempt to avoid controversy at 
the airport, I respectfully dissent.1 
I 
A 
 In 2011, the NAACP released a report entitled 
Misplaced Priorities which described the disparity between 
government spending on prisons and education in cities such 
as Philadelphia, New York, and Los Angeles.2 In anticipation 
                                                            
 1 While the City has proffered two rationales for 
upholding its ban—avoiding controversy and maximizing 
revenue—only one such justification is required to find it 
constitutional. Because I accept the controversy avoidance 
rationale, I address it alone and do not analyze the City’s 
revenue maximization arguments.  




of the report’s release, the NAACP planned a broad 
advertising campaign, which included a series of 
advertisements at the Philadelphia International Airport (the 
Airport). 
 The Airport is 3,254,354 square feet and includes 
seven terminals and 126 boarding gates. Like all large 
airports, it contains numerous retail businesses and various 
kiosks filled with advertisements targeting travelers. The City 
of Philadelphia, which owns and operates the Airport, 
maintains over 100 wall-mounted flat screen monitors to 
display advertisements. 
 The NAACP sought permission to run an 
advertisement for Misplaced Priorities on two of the 
Airport’s monitors. The advertisement featured a silhouette of 
the Statue of Liberty next to a block of text that read: 
“Welcome to America, home to 5% of the world’s people & 
25% of the world’s prisoners.” NAACP Br. 10. Beneath this 
text, the advertisement contained an additional sentence 
reading: “Let’s build a better America together. 
NAACP.org/smartandsafe.” Id. The City refused to display 
the NAACP’s advertisement. And it did so even though the 
City had no written policy governing the rejection of 
advertisements and despite the fact that it had previously 
accepted issue-oriented advertisements.  
 In October 2011, the NAACP filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
alleging that the City’s rejection of its advertisement violated 
the First Amendment. Almost six months later, the City 
issued a written policy (the Policy) regulating advertising at 
the Airport. Most relevant here, the Policy prohibited private 
parties from displaying advertisements “that do not propose a 
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commercial transaction,” but permitted the City to post 
messages promoting “the greater Philadelphia area” as well as 
“[o]ther City initiatives or purposes.” NAACP v. City of 
Philadelphia, 39 F. Supp. 3d 611, 623 (E.D. Pa. 2014) 
(alteration in original). Since the Policy’s enactment, no 
private noncommercial advertisements have been displayed. 
Noncommercial messages created by the City have been 
posted, however. 
 Three months later, the City and the NAACP entered 
into an agreement permitting the Misplaced Priorities 
advertisement to run in the Airport. The parties also agreed 
that the NAACP would file an amended complaint to 
challenge the Policy. The NAACP’s amended complaint 
alleged that the Policy was facially unconstitutional. 
B 
 In the course of discovery in the District Court, the 
City’s principal witness was James Tyrrell, the Airport’s 
Deputy Director of Aviation, Property Management, and 
Business Development. As the City’s Rule 30(b)(6) designee, 
Tyrrell testified on a number of topics, including “[t]he 
reason or purpose and the factors considered by the City for 
its decision to adopt, create, enact or promulgate the Airport 
Advertising Policy, and any communications concerning that 
decision.” App. 775. 
 When asked why the NAACP’s advertisement was 
rejected, Tyrrell responded that it did not comport with the 
Airport’s mission “to create an attractive environment 
to . . . promote tourism. It’s to create a family oriented 
environment. It is to promote the region, to attract customers 
to the region.” App. 784; see NAACP, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 622–
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23. He went on to say, when questioned whether the 
NAACP’s advertisement was offensive, that the Airport 
“make[s] a very concentrated and huge effort to keep 
everything positive, everything non-controversial, and just 
create an environment that is soothing and pleasing.” NAACP, 
39 F. Supp. 3d at 623–24; App. 802. And when asked how a 
ban on noncommercial advertisements could promote this 
mission, Tyrrell responded,  
If you talk about a commercial ad where 
someone is selling a product or a service, that is 
pretty broadly known, accepted, generally not 
going to be offensive. If you’re talking about a 
non-commercial ad that is maybe supporting a 
position of one group or another, that could tend 
to offend someone who is not in agreement with 
that position. 
App. 808. Tyrrell admitted that he “could not recall” if he had 
ever discussed this justification in any meeting and that it was 
“just something he was thinking of” during his deposition. Id. 
 After discovery was completed, the City and NAACP 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. To adjudicate the 
motions, the District Court determined that the relevant forum 
was the City-owned advertising space, not the Airport writ 
large or the many commercial business that lease space in the 
Airport. And it concluded that the advertising space was 
either a limited public forum or a nonpublic forum, but that it 
need not decide which because both types of forums operate 
under the same level of judicial scrutiny, i.e., speech 
restrictions must be reasonable in light of the purposes of the 
forum and viewpoint neutral. 
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 Starting with viewpoint neutrality, the Court held that 
neither party was entitled to summary judgment because 
material facts relative to the City’s motive in enacting the 
Policy were disputed. It nevertheless concluded that the 
NAACP was entitled to summary judgment because the 
Policy was unreasonable. 
 The District Court’s analysis began by identifying the 
purposes of the forum, one of which was “maintaining the 
Airport as a family friendly environment that casts a positive 
light on [Philadelphia] and the region.” NAACP, 39 F. Supp. 
3d at 628. In light of this purpose, the Court found the 
Policy’s exclusion of noncommercial advertisements 
unreasonable because there was nothing to suggest that 
noncommercial advertisements are any more (or less) 
controversial than commercial advertisements. Id. at 629–30. 
The Court also determined that noncommercial 
advertisements were in no way incompatible with the Airport 
as a whole—given that the Airport “contain[ed] many adult-
oriented potentially controversial media” in other spaces, 
restricting noncommercial advertisements in the advertising 
space would have no effect on the Airport’s functioning. Id. 
Accordingly, the Court held the Policy unconstitutional on its 
face and entered summary judgment in favor of the NAACP.  
II 
 The crux of the City’s appeal is that the Policy is 
reasonable because it helps to create a comfortable 
environment at the Airport by avoiding controversy without 





 It is important to note at the outset that the NAACP 
has brought a facial challenge to the City’s policy. “A facial 
attack tests a law’s constitutionality based on its text alone 
and does not consider the facts or circumstances of a 
particular case.” United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 
273 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer 
Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 n.11 (1988)). “This is the most 
difficult challenge to mount successfully,” and it “affects the 
burden on [the plaintiff].” United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 
387, 405 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff can only succeed in a 
facial challenge by ‘establish[ing] that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be 
valid,’ i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its 
applications.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican 
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).3  
                                                            
 3 The Majority neglects to mention the heavy burden 
facing those who bring a facial challenge, even in the First 
Amendment context. See Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 
449–51. Consequently, much of the reasoning it uses to find 
the Policy facially unconstitutional relies on the absence of 
record evidence and permissible inferences establishing the 
purpose of the forum and the connection between the Policy 
and that purpose. Majority Op. 19–24. The Majority’s holding 
implies that even if Airport executives tomorrow wrote an 
identical policy and explained that the purpose of the 
advertising space is to promote a comfortable and 
noncontroversial atmosphere and that a ban on 




 The Constitution does not require the “Government 
freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to 
free speech on every type of Government property without 
regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that 
might be caused by the speaker’s activities.” Cornelius, 473 
U.S. at 799–800. “[N]o less than a private owner of property, 
[the government] has power to preserve the property under its 
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” Id. at 
800 (quoting Greer, 424 U.S. at 836). To balance “the 
Government’s interest in limiting the use of its property to its 
intended purpose” and “the interest of those wishing to use 
the property for other purposes,” courts engage in forum 
analysis. Id. 
 Here, neither party challenges the District Court’s 
determinations that: (1) forum analysis applies; (2) the 
relevant forum is the Airport’s monitors; and (3) the forum is 
either a limited public forum or a nonpublic forum, both of 
which implicate the same level of scrutiny.4 Accordingly, the 
City may restrict the content of speech so long as the 
restriction is “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the 
forum” and viewpoint neutral. Rosenberger v. Rector & 
                                                                                                                                     
new policy could not be constitutional. While such a result is 
required by the Majority’s facial invalidation of the Policy, it 
would not be supported by its reasoning which dictates that 
outcome. 
 4 Without resolving the matter, I will refer to the forum 
here as a nonpublic forum.  
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Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (quoting 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804–06).5 
1 
 To determine whether the Policy is “reasonable in light 
of the purpose served by the forum,” we look to the “purpose 
of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances.” 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806, 809. In evaluating the Policy’s 
reasonableness, “we do not ‘require that . . . proof be present 
to justify the denial of access to a nonpublic forum on 
grounds that the proposed use may disrupt the property’s 
intended function,’ [but] we have required some explanation 
as to why certain speech is inconsistent with the intended use 
of the forum.” Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee 
(ISKCON), 505 U.S. 672, 691–92 (1992) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Perry Educ. 
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 52 n.12 
(1983)). In fact, “common-sense . . . is sufficient . . . to 
uphold a regulation.” United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 
734–35 (1990) (plurality opinion). And the restriction “need 
only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the 
only reasonable limitation.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808. 
Stated differently, a regulation of a nonpublic forum “is 
valid . . . unless it is unreasonable, or, as was said in Lehman, 
‘arbitrary, capricious, or invidious.’” Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 
                                                            
 5 The Supreme Court recently noted that there are four 
types of forums: (1) traditional public forums; (2) designated 
public forums; (3) limited public forums; and (4) nonpublic 
forums. Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250–51 (2015). I disagree with the 
Majority’s opinion to the extent it suggests otherwise. See 
Majority Op. 11 & n.2. 
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725–26 (quoting Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 US. 
298, 303 (1974)).  
 Here, as the District Court found, one of the purposes 
of the advertising space is to “maintain[] the Airport as a 
family-friendly” or comfortable environment. See NAACP, 39 
F. Supp. 3d at 628; see also App. 802 (Tyrrell stating that the 
Airport “make[s] a very concentrated and huge effort to keep 
everything positive, everything non-controversial, and just 
create an environment that is soothing and pleasing” when 
asked about the rejection of advertisements).6 
                                                            
 6 The Majority’s rationale for declining to infer that 
one purpose of the forum was to create a congenial 
environment is in error. According to the Majority, there is 
“no reason to doubt the City does try to maintain a ‘soothing 
and pleasing’ environment.” Majority Op. 23. Instead of 
stopping here and determining whether this fact supports an 
inference that the advertising space shares this purpose, the 
Majority goes on to add to this purpose a desire to ban 
noncommercial advertising to avoid controversy. And from 
this, the Majority concludes that since there is no ban on 
noncommercial advertising throughout the Airport, no 
inference can be made that the advertising space would have 
such a purpose. Id. at 22–23. In doing so, the Majority 
confuses the purpose of the forum—to create a soothing or 
congenial atmosphere—with the means of achieving that 
goal—banning noncommercial advertising. Because the latter 
does not illuminate the purpose of the forum, it should not be 
considered while attempting to discern as much. And while it 
is true that the parts of the Airport leased to others are not 
encumbered by the Policy’s prohibition of noncommercial 
advertising, this concern is properly analyzed when 
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 Our initial task then, is to determine whether the 
Policy’s ban on noncommercial advertisements is a 
reasonable or commonsense way to promote a congenial 
atmosphere through the use of the City’s more than 100 
Airport monitors. I believe it is.  
 As Tyrrell explained, noncommercial advertisements 
are more likely to be controversial or offensive than 
commercial offers. See App. 808. Noncommercial messages 
often seek to convey an opinion or advocate a position—goals 
motived by a desire to confront people on issues about which 
they disagree, sometimes very emotionally. Commercial 
advertisements on the other hand, seek only to sell a product 
and are less likely to advocate a position. Although it is 
undoubtedly true that some commercial advertisements may 
be more controversial or offensive than some noncommercial 
content, common sense suggests that advocative messages are 
more likely to create rancor and interfere with the City’s 
desire to promote a congenial atmosphere at the Airport.7  
 To use a simple example, imagine that the monitors 
are rented by an organization seeking to abolish the death 
penalty. To advance its cause, the organization depicts videos 
or photos of executions. If those advertisements were 
                                                                                                                                     
considering whether the Policy is reasonable in light of all the 
surrounding circumstances, not in determining the purpose of 
the forum. 
 7 To the extent the District Court and the NAACP 
claim that the City must show that noncommercial 
advertisements would disrupt the Airport’s functioning, I 
disagree. Because the forum at issue here is the monitors, the 
City must show only that noncommercial messages interfere 
with the goal of promoting a comfortable environment.  
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effective, perhaps death penalty advocates or victims’ rights 
groups would buy space showing similarly gruesome footage 
of the victims of those who were executed. It would seem 
obvious that these images would be controversial and 
inappropriate for travelers heading to their gates. While these 
examples were (before today) hypothetical, this may no 
longer be the case. And many courts that have considered 
similar dilemmas have found prohibitions on public transit 
like the one here reasonable attempts to keep the peace. See, 
e.g., Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion) (upholding a 
ban on noncommercial speech, in part, to avoid subjecting 
bus passengers and others to controversial messages);8 Am. 
Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l 
Transp. (SMART), 698 F.3d 885, 892–94 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(upholding a ban on political advertisements on buses that 
“might alienate riders”); Children of the Rosary v. City of 
Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 975, 979 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding it 
constitutional to limit exterior advertising on buses to “speech 
which proposes a commercial transaction” and holding that 
the city’s interests in “maintaining neutrality on political and 
religious issues” is “especially strong”).  
 But this does not end our inquiry. For a regulation to 
pass constitutional muster, it must also be reasonable in light 
of all the circumstances surrounding the forum. Here, those 
include the many other media and advertisements that fill the 
Airport, ranging from television screens tuned to news 
broadcasts to advertisements within retail outlets. Does the 
existence of media unconstrained by the Policy render it 
                                                            
 8 I disagree with the NAACP’s characterization of 
Lehman’s “captive audience” analysis. See Children of the 
Rosary, 154 F.3d at 977 (rejecting a similar argument). 
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unreasonable in its regulation of the advertising space? I think 
not.  
 By banning noncommercial advertisements on the 
monitors there will be less controversy in the Airport than 
there would be if the Policy were never enacted. While other 
forums scattered throughout the Airport might display 
controversial noncommercial messages, it still seems 
reasonable to think that disallowing controversial 
advertisements on the Airport’s more than 100 monitors will 
have a positive impact on travelers’ experiences by removing 
some stress or controversy from their journeys. Because the 
Policy reasonably achieves the goal of promoting a congenial 
environment in light of the surrounding circumstances, I 
would find it facially reasonable. 
 The NAACP counters that the Policy is unreasonable 
because it simultaneously forbids the noncommercial speech 
of private parties and permits noncommercial speech by the 
City. This argument could carry the day but for the 
government speech doctrine. Although the First Amendment 
prevents the City from circumscribing private speech 
however it wishes, those restrictions do not apply when the 
City itself speaks and the City may control the content it 
wishes to display on its monitors. Cf. Walker v. Texas Div., 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 
(2015) (“[W]hen [the] government speaks, it is not barred by 
the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what 
it says.”). Because the City has the latitude to control its own 
speech, it is reasonable for the City not to subject itself to the 
same constraints to which it must subject private speakers.  
 In all, the Policy need not be the most reasonable or 
the only reasonable way to achieve the goals the City wishes 
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to pursue on its monitors. The Policy need only be 
reasonable—that is, it must not be arbitrary, capricious, or 
invidious. For the reasons stated, I would hold that the Policy 
satisfies what the Majority rightly acknowledged is a “light” 
burden, Majority Op. 26.  
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 Apart from being reasonable, a speech restriction in a 
nonpublic forum must also be viewpoint neutral. Pittsburgh 
League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. Port Auth., 653 F.3d 
290, 296 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 
829). This means that if the government permits speech 
regarding a particular subject on government property, it must 
allow for the expression of all viewpoints on that subject. 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. To do otherwise and deny access 
to a forum solely to suppress a point of view is “anathema to 
free expression and impermissible in both public and 
nonpublic fora.” Pittsburgh League, 653 F.3d at 296 (citing 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S 377, 382 (1992)). 
 Here, the NAACP claims the Policy is not viewpoint 
neutral for two reasons: (1) the City distinguished between 
commercial and noncommercial advertisements for 
discriminatory reasons; and (2) it allows the City to post 
noncommercial advertisements while prohibiting private 
groups from doing so. For reasons I shall explain, I disagree. 
i 
 According to the NAACP, the City intended to 
discriminate against views that run contrary to the City’s 
viewpoint when it enacted the Policy and this illicit motive 
requires the Policy’s invalidation. This argument is foreclosed 
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by the NAACP’s facial challenge. Since the Policy excludes 
private speakers who agree with the City as well as those who 
disagree, it is facially neutral and our inquiry in that regard is 
complete. See Bailey v. Callaghan, 715 F.3d 956, 959–60 
(6th Cir. 2013) (declining to look beyond the text of a 
facially-neutral statute to examine claims of improper 
legislative motive because “the law forecloses this kind of 
adventure”); Wisc. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 
640, 648–53 (7th Cir. 2013) (same). And even assuming, 
arguendo, that the City had such a motive and that an inquiry 
into the City’s motivations is permissible in the context of 
this facial challenge, the NAACP’s argument still fails. 
 To the NAACP, motive is relevant because “the line 
between viewpoints and subjects is such an elusive one” and 
“classifying a particular viewpoint as a subject rather than as 
a viewpoint on a subject” can be a tactic to impermissibly 
exclude unwanted viewpoints from a particular forum. See 
NAACP Br. 44 (quoting Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion 
Cty. Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1298 (7th Cir. 1996)). While 
this reasoning could support an argument that 
“noncommercial speech” is actually a viewpoint rather than a 
subject matter which may be banned, the NAACP neither 
makes this argument nor would it be supported by caselaw. 
See, e.g., Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303–04 (upholding a 
regulation that banned political and issue-based advertising); 
Pittsburgh League, 653 F.3d at 297 (noting that rejecting 
advertisements because of their noncommercial character is 
viewpoint neutral); Children of the Rosary, 154 F.3d at 975, 
980–81 (finding a regulation permitting only commercial 
advertising on buses viewpoint neutral); Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650, 653, 656–59 (2d Cir. 
1995) (finding a regulation permitting only commercial 
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advertising on a large billboard viewpoint neutral). And to the 
extent the NAACP argues that an illicit motive alone is 
sufficient to invalidate a policy, I cannot agree because the 
Supreme Court has stated otherwise. See United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“It is a familiar principle 
of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an 
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged 
illicit legislative motive.”); see also Children of the Rosary, 
154 F.3d at 980 (stating that motive alone “is not dispositive 
when there is no indication that the city is implementing the 
standard in a viewpoint discriminatory manner that reflects an 
intent to use the policy to exclude disfavored perspectives on 
the issues”); cf. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 811–13 (questioning 
the viewpoint neutrality of a regulation in light of allegations 
of both improper motive and viewpoint discriminatory 
application). “A façade for viewpoint discrimination, in short, 
requires discrimination behind the façade.” Grossbaum, 100 
F.3d at 1292–94, 1296–98. 
ii 
 The NAACP also argues that the Policy discriminates 
on the basis of viewpoint because it allows the City to post 
noncommercial advertisements despite forbidding private 
advertisers from doing the same. According to the NAACP, 
the Policy is a façade for viewpoint discrimination because 
the City may speak on issues such as the value of beer 
brewing, but the Policy would prohibit a temperance 
organization from posting a countervailing advertisement. In 
response, the City seeks refuge in the government speech 




 According to the government speech doctrine, “when 
[the] government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech 
Clause from determining the content of what it says.” Walker, 
135 S. Ct. at 2245. Rather, “[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts 
government regulation of private speech.” Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). And when the 
government speaks, “the First Amendment strictures that 
attend the various types of government-established forums do 
not apply.” Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250. Instead, “the 
democratic electoral process . . . provides a check on 
government speech.” Id. at 2245.  
 Based on these statements, our inquiry into the 
viewpoint neutrality of the Policy is straightforward. Limiting 
the field of the City’s speech in this area would appear to be 
foreclosed by Summum and Walker, both of which make clear 
that the strictures of the Free Speech Clause do not apply to 
government speech. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245–46, 2250; 
Summum, 555 U.S. at 467–69. For this reason, I would find 
the Policy’s exception for government noncommercial speech 
permissible. I say this with some hesitation, however, because 
both Summum and Walker focused on whether all the speech 
in a given venue constituted private speech or government 
speech. Unlike those cases, here the City’s speech occurs in a 
venue shared by the government and private speakers alike. 
This difference raises a number of unique concerns not 
directly at issue in Summum and Walker. 
 For instance, with the government and private parties 
sharing the same venue, passersby may have difficulty 
identifying who is responsible for displaying any particular 
message. At this point, the check provided by the democratic 
process largely disappears, as the ability to discern the City’s 
speech is impaired.  
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 In addition, with the power to express noncommercial 
positions and exclude those to the contrary, the City could 
create an environment in which passersby are led to believe 
that the City’s positions are uncontested. It may appear that 
the opportunity to contest the government’s message exists by 
posting an opposing advertisement on the wall monitors, but 
that no one has done so. This illusion of consensus, which 
uniquely threatens the marketplace of ideas, is similar to the 
concern Justice Alito warned of in his dissent in Walker. See 
135 S. Ct. at 2255–56 (arguing that the Court’s understanding 
of the government speech doctrine may permit the 
government to erect electronic billboards, post its own 
messages on them, simultaneously display only those private 
advertisements it approves of, and avoid the First Amendment 
by asserting all of the speech emanates from the government). 
In response to that concern, the Court has instructed that 
when the government speaks, “it is not barred by the Free 
Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says” 
and “the First Amendment strictures that attend the various 
types of government-established forums do not apply.” 
Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245, 2250. Based on that directive, I 
must conclude that the Policy does not implicate viewpoint 
discrimination concerns that would plainly exist if private 
speech were at issue.  
* * * 
 For the reasons stated, I would reverse the District 
Court’s order and enter summary judgment for the City of 
Philadelphia. 
